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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
RICHARD WILLIAM BURGESS, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 93 378-CA 
Category No. 15 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION 
This court has jurisdiction over this appeal 
pursuant to Utah Code Section 78-2a-3 (2) (f). 
Defendant/Appellant appeals from a final order entered in 
the Eighth Judicial District Court, Duchesne County on 
February 12, 1993. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON 
APPEAL AND STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
1. Do the changes in the law reflected in current 
Utah Code Section 77-l6a-201 et seq. affect appellant's 
substantive rights thereby precluding retroactive 
application of such statute? 
The standard of review in determining a question of 
law is a "correction of error" standard of review. 
Standard Federal Savings Loan Association v. Kirkbride , 821 
P. 2d 1136 (Utah 1992). 
2. Did the trial court lose jurisdiction to alter 
or amend the original judgment, sentence and commitment 
since the judgment, sentence and commitment was a valid 
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sentence? 
The standard of review in determining a question of 
law is a Correction of error" standard of review. 
Standard Federal Savings Loan Association v. Kirkbride . 821 
P. 2d 1136 (Utah 1992) 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Any relevant text of constitutional provisions, 
statutes or rules pertinent to the resolution of the issues 
presented on appeal is contained in the body of this brief 
or attached as an addendum to this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The appellant, Burgess, pled guilty and mentally 
ill to three counts of sexual abuse of a child, each a 
second degree felony, and was sentenced on or about August 
30, 1990. For each of the offenses, Burgess was sentenced 
to a term of not less than one nor more than fifteen years 
in the Utah State Training School with the sentences to run 
consecutively. Burgess was sentenced under then Utah Code 
Section 77-16a-1 et seq. R31 P. 72-73. 
On or about October 7, 1992, the Utah State 
Training School recommended that Burgess be committed to the 
Utah State Prison. R31 P. 79. On February 12, 1993, the 
court ordered that further review of this matter should 
proceed under the current statute regarding defendants found 
guilty and mentally ill, namely Utah Code Section 
77_l6a-203. R31 P. 108. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Burgess was charged in 1990 with 11 counts of 
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sexual auuse of a child, each a second degree felony. R39 
P. 4-2. On July 9, 1990, Burgess entered pleas of guilty 
and mentally ill to three counts of sexual abuse of a child, 
each a second degree felony. R31 P. 33. The court ordered 
that a hearing be held as soon as practible to determine 
Burgess' claim of mental illness. R39 P. 31. 
On August 27, 1990, a hearing was held to determine 
whether Burgess was currently mentally ill. R31 P. 74.. At 
the hearing, Robert J. Howell, PHD, and Phillip Washburn, 
MD, testified on behalf of Burgess. Harold Blakelock, PHD, 
testified on behalf of the state. Following the hearing, 
the court entered findings of fact and conclusions of law 
finding that Burgess had a mental illness with an IQ in the 
52-58 range. The court further found Burgess posed an 
immediate physical danger to others and that the Utah State 
Training School was able to provide Burgess with treatment 
and care adequate to his needs. R31 P. 70-71. Thereafter, a 
judgment, sentence and commitment was entered sentencing 
Burgess to the Utah State Training School for three 
consecutive terms of not less than one nor more than fifteen 
years. R31 P. 72-73. 
On or about October 7, 1992, the TTtah State 
Developmental Center (Htah State Training School) sent a 
letter to the district court recommending that Burgess be 
committed to the Utah State Prison based on amended Utah 
Code Section 77-l6a-202. R31 P. 79. The state thereafter 
moved the court for an order to transport the defendant to 
the Utah State Training School and an order that the mental 
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condition of Burgess be evaluated pursuant to current Utah 
Law dealing with mentally ill offenders. The motion also 
requested a recommendation of whether Burgess should be 
transferred to the Utah Department of Corrections or remain 
committed to the Utah State Training School or placed in the 
custody of the Department of Human Services. R.31 P. 88. 
After briefing and argument by the parties, the court 
entered its order allowing review of Burgess under the 
current statute, Utah Code Section, 77-l6a-203. R31 P. 108. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court erroneously concluded that the 
present law contained at Utah Code Section, 77-16a-1 et seq. 
should be applied to Burgess in the future. The general 
rule in Utah is that a statute cannot be given retroactive 
effect unless the legislature expressly declares such an 
intent in the statute. Utah Code Section 68-3-3. An 
exception to the rule exists where a statute only affects 
procedural and not substantive rights. Washington National 
Insurance Company v. Sherwood Associates , 795 P. 2d 665 
(Utah App. 1990). A statute is considered procedural or 
remedial, as opposed to substantive, if the statute does not 
enlarge, eliminate or destroy vested rights. Smith v. 
Cook 803 P. 2d 788 (Utah 1990). A change in a statutory 
remedy or defense is a substantive change if it affects the 
rights and duties of the parties. Washington , supra. 
In this case, it can hardly be argued that the 
change affected by Utah Code Section, 77-16a-1 et seq. does 
not substantively change the rights of Burgess and the 
I 
obligation of the state. Under prior law, which was in 
effect at the time Burgess was sentenced, it was not 
possible for Burgess to be sent to the TTtah State Prison 
until the TTtah State Training School first proposed to 
discharge him. Utah Code Section, 77-l6a-8 U ) (1990). 
Current law provides that Burgess could be sent to the TTtah 
State Prison on the recommendation of a physhiatrist and 
other mental health personnel. TTtah Code Section, 
77-l6a-203, 204.. Therefore, the changes made in the law 
are substantive and should not apply retroactively, contrary 
to the order of the court. 
The order entered by the trial court had the affect 
of amending the original judgment, sentence and commitment. 
The original sentence issued by the trial court was a valid 
sentence. The order issued by the trial court and which is 
at issue here, had the affect of amending the original 
sentence. Once a court imposes a valid sentence, it loses 
subject matter jurisdiction over the case and no longer has 
power to amend the judgment. State v. Montoya , 825 P. 2d 
676 (TTtah App* 1991 )• Since the original sentence was 
valid, the court improperly amended the sentence. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS CONCLUSION 
THAT CURRENT UTAH CODE SECTION 77-l6a-201 
ET SEQ. SHOULD BE APPLIED RETROACTIVELY 
TO BURGESS. 
When Burgess was sentenced, it was under Utah Code 
Section, 77-l6a-1 through 8 (19Q0) attached as Addendum A. 
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Section 77-16a-4 provided that with regard to mentally 
retarded persons if the court found that a defendant had a 
mental illness, posed an immediate physical danger to self 
or others and the Utah State Hospital, the TTtah State 
Training School or other proposed facility was able to 
provide the defendant with treatment, care and custody that 
was adequate and appropriate to the defendant's conditions 
and needs that the court should order commitment to such 
facility if it found the facts required above by clear and 
convincing evidence. 
A hearing was held specifically for the purpose of 
determining the mental condition of Burgess R31 P. 29. At 
the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court found by 
clear and convincing evidence the elements required above 
and sentenced Burgess to the Utah State Training School for 
three consecutive one to fifteen year terms. R31 P. 70, 
72. The practical effect of the sentence as imposed by the 
court was that Burgess could spend up to 45 years in the 
TTtah State Training School. The period of commitment for a 
mentally retarded offender could be no longer than the 
maximum sentence imposed by the court. Utah Code Section, 
77-l6a-8 (3) (1990). 
Section 77-16a-8 (4.) governed the procedure to be 
followed if the facility to which a defendant had been 
committed under section 77-16a-4 proposed to discharge the 
defendant prior to the expiration of his sentence. The 
statute states: 
When the facility to which a defendant has 
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been committed under Section 77-1 6a-4. proposes 
to discharge the defendant prior to the 
expiration of his sentence, the facility shall 
transmit to the board of pardons a report on 
the condition of defendant, including the 
clinical facts, the diagnosis, the course of 
treatment, the prognosis for the remission 
of symptoms, the potential for recidivism 
and for the danger to himself or the public, 
and the recommendations for future treatment. 
The board of pardons shall direct that 
defendant serve any or all of the unexpired 
term of the sentence at the state prison, or 
place the defendant on parole. 
Under Section 77-16a-8 (A.)9 a defendant would serve 
out his sentence unless the Utah State Training School 
believed that he should be released from custody. In that 
event, the board of pardons would review defendant and his 
status and determine whether the defendant should be 
released on parole or serve additional time at the state 
prison. 
The operative word of the statute is discharge. In 
criminal matters, discharge means "the act by which a person 
in confinement, held on an accusation of some crime or 
misdemeanor, is set at liberty." BlackTs Law Dictionary 4.17 
(5th ed. 1979). The court in State ex. rel« Herman v» 
Powell , 367 P. 2d 553 (Mon. 1961) stated: 
A "discharge" releases a person entirely from 
custody; his debt to the state is considered 
"paid in full." 
In State ex. rel. Haynes v. Powers , 154- N.E. 2d 
19 (Ohio) discharge was defined as including a release from 
confinement. Other courts have defined discharge in a 
similar fashion. State v. Fish , 122 N.W. 2d 3*1 (Wis). 
Davison v. Rodes , 299 S.W. 2d 5°»1 (Mo.). 
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In view of the legal meaning of the word discharge, 
it is clear that under the statute which Burgess was 
sentenced, he would stay at the TTtah State Training School 
until the school believed he should be released from 
custody. The only possibility of Burgess being confined in 
prison would be if he was deemed by the Utah State Training 
School fit to be released from confinement and the board of 
pardons determined that he should serve additional time at 
the state prison. 
The law on mentally retarded offenders in effect at 
the time Burgess was sentenced was repealed effective June 
30, 1992. The current law applicable to mentally ill 
offenders is contained at Utah Code Section, 77-l6a-101 
through 205 attached as Addendum B. Under section 
77-l6a-104., upon findings similiar to the findings required 
under the prior law for mentally ill offenders in effect 
when Burgess was sentenced, the court may order probation, 
commit a defendant to the Department of Human Services or 
sentence a defendant to a term of imprisonment. When 
committing a defendant to the Department of Human Services 
for care and treatment the court may sentence an offender to 
a term of imprisonment and commit him to the Department of 
Human services until transferred to prison or sentence the 
offender to a term of imprisonment and order that he be 
committed to the department for care and treatment for not 
more than 18 months at which time the defendant may be 
resentenced. Section 77-l6a-202. 
Under current law, the executive director of the 
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Department of Human Services may recommend that a mentally 
ill defendant which includes a mentally retarded offender is 
elligiule for transfer to the Utah Department of Corrections 
if a review team finds the offender is no longer mentally 
ill or is still mentally ill and continues to be a danger to 
himself or others but can be controlled if adequate care, 
medication, and treatment are provided and he has reached 
the maximum benefit from the program within the department. 
If this recommendation is made, then the Utah Department of 
Corrections designates a transfer team to evaluate the 
recommendations provided by the Department of Human 
vServices. The Department of Corrections may concur in the 
recommendation or disagree with the recommendation of the 
Department of Human Services. If there is a disagreement, 
the mental health advisor for the board of pardons shall 
settle the dispute. Utah Code Section 77-l6a-203 and 204.. 
The current statute would allow Burgess to be transferred 
out of the Utah State Training School to the Utah State 
Prison without the belief by the training school that 
Burgess should be discharged from custody. 
The issue is whether current Utah law should be 
applied to Burgess during his confinement. The general rule 
regarding retroactive application of statutes is stated in 
73 Am Jur 2d Statutes Section 350 as follows: 
Courts observe a strict rule of construction 
against a retrospective operation, and 
indulge in the presumption that the legislature 
intended statutes, or amendments thereof, 
enacted by it, to operate prospectively only 
and not retroactively . 
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Utah has codified the general rule in Utah Code 
Section, 68-3-3 which states: 
No part of these revised statutes is 
retroactive, unless expressly so declared. 
An exception to the general rule exists under which 
even without express legislative intent a statute may be 
applied retroactively if it affects only procedural and not 
substantive rights, Washington National Insurance Company 
v. Sherwood Associates , 795 P. 2d 665 (TJtah app. 1990). 
The court in Washington , supra , defined 
substantive as follows: 
Substantive law is defined as the 
positive law which creates, defines and 
regulates the rights and duties of the 
parties and which may give rise to a cause 
of action, as distinquished from an 
objective law which pertains to and 
prescribes the practice and procedure or 
the legal machinery by which the substantive 
law is determined or made effective* 
The court in Clark v. Cassidy , 636 P. 2d 134-4. 
(Hawaii) defined substantive rights as: 
The rights "which1 take away or impair 
vested rights required under existing laws, 
or create a new obligation, impose a new 
duty, or attach a new disability in respect 
to transactions or considerations already 
past," as distinquished from remedies or 
procedural laws which merely prescribe 
methods of enforcement or give effect to 
existing rights. 
It is clear that the rights of Burgess which would 
be affected if the current law were applied to his situation 
are substantive in nature. 
In State v. Abeyta , 212 TJtah Adv. Rep. 10 (TJtah 
1993)i the court determined that an amendment to TJtah Code 
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Section 77-13-6 (2) which added a requirement that a motion 
to withdraw a guilty plea must be made within thirty days 
after entry of the plea should not be applied retroactively 
since the amendment was substantive not procedural. 
In Washington supra, the issue before the court 
was whether a statutory amendment removing a mortgage 
owner's right to cure a default at any time prior to 
foreclosure should be applied retroactively in order to 
prevent trustor under a deed of trust from curing the 
default by paying the amount in default rather than the 
total amount due under a note* The court held that the 
statute affected a substantive right since the change in the 
statute affected the rights and duties of the parties. 
In State v. Yates , 834 P. 2d 599 (TTtah App. 1992) 
the court dealt with the issue of whether a statute should 
be applied retroactively which would affect the foreclosure 
of vehicles involved in criminal activity. The defendant 
argued that a 1992 amendment which only allowed for 
foreclosure of vehicles involved in felonies should be 
retroactively applied. The court stated: 
The statutory amendment alters the group of 
individuals whose property is subject to 
forfeiture as a penalty for committing 
a criminal offense. This change is 
substantive in that it affects 
substantial rights. 
In the present case, BurgessT rights will be 
affected as it will be easier for him to be moved to the 
state prison which is unquestionably a harsher environment 
than the Utah State Training School. The change in the 
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location of Burgess confinement from the training school to 
the prison would affect his rights in a more substantive way 
that would the loss of property as discussed in Washington 
and Yates above. The current law on mentally ill 
offenders should not be applied to Burgess. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AMENDING THE JUDGMENT, 
SENTENCE AND COMMITMENT ISSUED ON OR ABOUT 
AUGUST 30, 1990 BY ISSUING IT'S ORDER GIVING THE 
DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES AUTHORITY TO PROCEED 
UNDER THE CURRENT LAW REGARDING MENTALLY ILL 
OFFENDERS. 
The order issued by the trial court and which is 
the subject of this appeal has the affect of modifying the 
judgment, sentence and commitment by changing the conditions 
under which Burgess could be transferred to the Utah State 
Prison. 
The trial court has continuing jurisdiction to 
correct an illegal sentence. State v. Babbel , 813 P. 2d 
86 (Utah 1991). In this case a valid sentence was imposed 
so the court had no jurisdiction to alter or amend the 
judgment. The case of State v. Montoya , 825 P. 2d 676 
(Utah app. 1991) is determinative in this case. In Montoya 
the court stated: 
The Utah Supreme Court has recognized the 
"continuing jurisdiction of a trial court 
to correct an illegal sentence.n State 
v. Babbell , 813 P. 2d 86 (Utah app. 1991). 
Because an illegal sentence is void the 
court did not lose jurisdiction over the 
sentence until that sentence has been 
corrected. The negative implication in 
this principle is also spelled out in 
Babbel . Once a court imposes a valid 
sentence, it loses subject matter 
jurisdiction over the case. Id. 
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(citing State v. Lee Lim , 7 p. 2d 825 
(1932)). 
This rule was followed in Grease v. Pleasant Grove 
City , 51^ P. 2d 888 (Utah 1974). In that case, the 
defendant was sentenced to 90 days in jail. The jail 
sentence was suspended if the defendant would comply with 
certain conditions. The defendant failed to comply and the 
trial court issued a commitment which added an additional 30 
days to the 90 days previously imposed. The Utah Supreme 
Court held that the trial court was without authority to 
change the sentence. The general rule cited above has been 
followed in other states. People v. Campbell , 738 P. 2d 
779 (Colo. 1987) State v. Dove , 754 P. 2d 1017 (Wash. 
1988). 
For the court at this stage of BurgessT case to 
order the state to proceed under current Utah Law would 
violate the double jeopardy clause of the federal 
constitution in amendment v which states: n... nor shall 
any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put 
in jeopardy of life or limb." Once a defendant begins to 
serve a lawful sentence, he may not be sentenced to an 
increased term; to do so violates the constitutional 
prescription against double jeopardy. Dolby v. State , 787 
P. 2d 388 (Nev. 1990) citing Ex Parte Lange , 85 U.S. 163 
(1873) and U.S.v. Evans , 459 F. 2d 1134 (D.C. Cir. 1972). 
Righi v. People , 359 p. 2d 656 (Colo. 1961). In Dolby , 
the defendant was convicted of robbery of a victim 65 years 
of age or older, attempted second degree kidnapping and 
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attempted murder of a victim 65 years of age or older. At 
sentencing, the court illegally sentenced the defendant to 
an enhanced penality of 10 years on the charge of attempted 
murder of a victim 65 years of age or older. When the court 
resentenced the defendant on that charge, it increased his 
initial sentence from 10 years on the attempted murder 
charge to 20 years. The appellate court held that only the 
unlawful sentence could be vacated and that the defendant's 
lawful sentence could not ue modified. 
By increasing the possibility that Burgess may be 
incarcerated at the Utah State Prison rather than at the 
Utah Training School, the court would be increasing the 
sentence of Burgess. 
Because the court lacked authority to alter or 
amend the original judgment in this matter, this court 
should overturn the order dated February 12, 1993 entered by 
the trial court. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing argument, this court 
should overturn the order entered by the trial court on 
February 12, 1993 and require the State of Utah and its 
agents to proceed in regard to Burgess under Utah Code 
Section, 77-16a-1 through 8 (1990), the law under which 
Burgess was sentenced. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this day of July, 
1993. 
U 
Joel D. Berrett 
Attorney for Defendant/ 
Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING U H j a i i r l O l i L VJT HiiJL.Li.Lmx 
I hereby certify that a true and accurate copy of 
the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT was mailed, postage 
prepaid, to Janet C. Graham, Attorney General, Attorney for 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 236 State Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah 
84111, this day of July, 1993. 
Joel D. Berrett 
ADDENDUM A 
77-16-1 UTAH CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 196 
menced. Examination of defendants on local ordi-
nance violations shall be charged to the municipality 
or county commencing the prosecution. 
(2) When examination is initiated by the court or 
on motion of the prosecutor, expenses of commitment 
and treatment of the person confined to a mental 
health facility after examination shall also be 
charged to the state. When examination is initiated 
by the accused, the state may recover expenses of 
treatment and commitment from his estate. 
(3) Expenses of examination, treatment, or con-
finement in a mental health facility for any convict in 
a state penal facility shall be charged to the state. 
(4) The clerk of the district court which ordered an 
examination to be held shall certify the costs to the 
state auditor, or to the board of county commissioners 
or the municipality, as appropriate. 
(5) If the defendant, after examination, is found to 
be competent, all subsequent costs are charged to the 
county commencing prosecution. 1939 
CHAPTER 16 
MENTAL EXAMINATION AFTER 
CONVICTION 
Section 
77-16-1. Grounds for ordering examination. 
77-16-2. Appointment of examining alienists — Re-
port — Additional evidence by defendant 
— Findings — Sentencing — Compensa-
tion of alienists. 
77-16-3. Care and treatment of persons committed. 
77-16-4. Defendant incapable of treatment at state 
hospital — Hearing — Proceeding. 
77-16-5. Recovery of committed person — Certifica-
tion to Board of Pardons. 
77-16-1. Grounds for ordering examination. 
Whenever any person is convicted of or pleads 
guilty to rape, forcible sodomy, forcible sexual abuse, 
aggravated sexual assault, aggravated kidnaping, ag-
gravated assault, mayhem, or an attempt to commit 
any of the foregoing crimes, and when it appears to 
the court either upon its own observation or upon 
evidence otherwise presented, that the defendant 
may be suffering from any form of mental disease or 
defect which may have substantially contributed to 
the commission of the offense, the court shall order a 
mental examination of that person. i960 
77-16-2. Appointment of examining alienists — 
Report — Additional evidence by de-
fendant — Findings — Sentencing — 
Compensation of alienists. 
(1) The examination of the defendant shall be con-
ducted by two or more alienists appointed by the 
judge. Upon completion of the examination but not 
later than 30 days after the order directing the exam-
ination, a written report of the results shall be pro-
vided to the sentencing judge. If the report discloses 
that the person is not suffering from any form of men-
tal disease or defect which may have substantially 
contributed to the commission of the offense, the 
judge, after afibrding the defendant an opportunity to 
see the report, may impose sentence. Prior to the im-
position of sentence, if the defendant so desires, he 
may offer additional evidence on the question of his 
mental condition. 
(2) If the report or other evidence presented to the 
court discloses that the defendant suffers from any 
form of mental disease or defect which substantially 
contributed to the commission of the offense, but 
which was not of such magnitude as to preclude sen-
tence, the judge shall make written findings of fact as 
to the defendant's condition and order him committed 
to the Utah state prison or other facility for indefinite 
confinement for treatment until the defendant is oth-
erwise released pursuant to this chapter. 
(3) The judge shall fix the compensation, if any, to 
be paid the examining alienists and upon certifica-
tion of the amount of compensation by the judge, the 
board of county commissioners in the county wherein 
the offense was committed shall make payment, i960 
77-16-3. Care and treatment of persons commit-
ted. 
The clinical director of the Utah State Hospital 
shall provide for the treatment and care of persons 
committed to the hospital under this chapter and 
shall render treatment which in his judgment is best 
suited to care for the needs of such persons. i960 
77-16-4. Defendant incapable of treatment at 
state hospital — Hearing — Proceed-
ing. 
If the clinical director of the state hospital con-
cludes, or the defendant contends, that the defendant 
is not capable of receiving treatment, or that appro-
priate treatment is not available at the hospital, ei-
ther may petition the sentencing court to return the 
defendant before the court for further proceedings. If 
the court finds that the defendant is not capable of 
receiving treatment, or that appropriate treatment is 
not available at that hospital for the defendant, he 
shall proceed the same as if the defendant had not 
been proceeded against under this chapter, with 
credit being given for the time spent at the hospital. 
1980 
77-16-5. Recovery of committed person — Certi-
fication to Board of Pardons. 
( D A person committed to the state hospital after 
sentence who has sufficiently recovered from his 
mental disease or defect shall be certified to the 
Board of Pardons by the clinical director. 
Upon certification, jurisdiction over the person 
shall be transferred to the Board of Pardons and he 
shall be pardoned, paroled or confined in the state 
prison for the unexpired term for the offense as pro-
vided by law with credit for time served while con-
fined at the hospital. The certification of the clinical 
director of the hospital shall specify with particular-
ity the medical facts justifying his certification. 
(2) The provisions of law and the rules and regula-
tions promulgated pursuant thereto, regarding parole 
shall apply to persons paroled from the state hospital. 
I9SO 
CHAPTER 16a 
MENTALLY ILIVMENTALLY RETARDED 
EXAMINATION 
Section 
77-16a-l. Plea of guilty and mentally ill — Evalua-
tion — Procedures — Expenses. 
77-16a-2. Court's instructions regarding pleas. 
77-16a-3. Hearing to determine current mental ill-
ness. 
77-16a-4. Commitment to jurisdiction of Psychiatric 
Security Review Board. 
77-16a-5. Transfer from Psychiatric Security Review 
Board — Board of Pardons — Parole — 
Review. 
77-16a-6. Probation for mentally ill persons. 
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-7-l6a-7- Jurisdiction of persons on probation. 
"7-l6a-8. Commitment of mentally retarded of-
fenders. 
-7-l6n-l . Plea of guilty and mentally ill — Eval-
uation — Procedures — Expenses . 
il) Upon a plea of guilty and mentally ill being 
tendered by a defendant to any charge, the court shall 
hold a hearing within a reasonable time to determine 
the defendant's claim of mental illness. Mental ill-
ne$s. for this purpose, means the same as that term is 
defined in Subsection 76-2-305(4). 
(2) The court may order the defendant to be evalu-
ated at the Utah State Hospital or any other suitable 
facility, and may receive the evidence of any private 
or public expert witness offered by the defendant or 
the prosecutor. 
(3) A defendant who tenders a plea of guilty and 
mentally ill shall be examined first by the trial judge 
in compliance with the standards for taking pleas of 
guilty. The defendant shall be advised that a plea of 
guilty and mentally ill is a plea of guilty and not a 
contingent plea. If the defendant is later found not to 
be mentally ill, a guilty plea otherwise lawfully made 
remains a valid plea of guilty. The defendant shall be 
sentenced as any other offender. 
(4) If the court concludes that the defendant is cur-
rently mentally ill, applying the standards set forth 
in this chapter, the defendant's plea shall be accepted 
and he shall be sentenced as a mentaJJy iJ] offender. 
Expenses of examination, observation, or treatment, 
excluding travel to and from any mental health or 
handicapped services facility, shall be charged to the 
county. When the offense is a state offense, the state 
shall pay all of the expense. Travel expenses shall be 
charged to the county where prosecution is com-
menced. Examination of defendants charged with 
municipal or county ordinance violations shall be 
charged to the municipality or county commencing 
the prosecution. IWO 
77-16a-2. Court's instructions regarding pleaa. 
If a defendant at trial asserts a defense o( not guilty 
by reason of insanity, the court shall instruct the jury 
that it may find the defendant guilty, not guilty, not 
guilty by reason of insanity, guilty and mentally ill, 
guilty of a lesser offense, or guilty of a lesser ofTense 
due to mental illness but not an illness that would 
warrant full exoneration. i»o 
77-16a-3. Hearing to determine current mental 
illness. 
Upon a verdict of guilty and mentally ill to the 
ofTense charged, or any lesser offense, the court shall 
conduct a hearing to determine the defendant's 
present mental state. If the court finds that the defen-
dant is currently mentally ill, it shall sentence the 
defendant as a mentally ill offender. The court shall 
impose any sentence that could be imposed under law 
upon a defendant who is convicted of the same of-
fense, iwo 
77- 16a~4. Commitment to jurisdiction of Psychi-
atric Security Review Board. 
(1) The court shall, in its sentence, order commit-
ment of mentally ill but not mentally retarded per-
sons to the jurisdiction of the Psychiatric Security 
Review Board established under Section 77-38-2. 
With regard to both mentally ill persons and persons 
who are mentally retarded, the court shall order com-
mitment to the Utah State Hospital, the Utah State 
Training School, or other appropriate secure facility 
operated by the Department of Social Services if, 
upon completion of the hearing and consideration of 
the record, the court finds by clear and convincing 
evidence that: 
(a) the defendant has a mental illness as de-
fined by Subsection 76-2-305(4); 
(b) because of his mental illness the defendant 
poses an immediate physical danger to self or 
others, which may include jeopardizing his own 
or others' safety, health, or welfare if placed in a 
correctional or probation setting, or lacks the 
ability to provide the basic necessities of life, 
such as food, clothing, and shelter, if placed on 
probation; 
(c) the Utah State Hospital, the Utah State 
Training School, or other proposed facility is able 
to provide the defendant with treatment, care, 
and custody that is adequate and appropriate to 
the defendant's conditions and needs. 
(2) The period of commitment to the Utah State 
Hospital, the Utah State Training School, or other 
facility operated by the Department of Social Ser-
vices, or to the jurisdiction of the Psychiatric Security 
Review Board under this section may in no circum-
stance be longer than the maximum sentence im-
posed by the court. 1990 
77-16a-5. Transfer from Psychiatric Security 
Review Board — Board of Pardons — 
Parole — Review. 
With regard to mentally ill 6ut not mentally re-
tarded persons: 
(1) Every six months, the Psychiatric Security 
Review Board shall review the condition of each 
person under its jurisdiction at the state hospital, 
to determine whether custody should be trans-
ferred to the Board of Pardons. 
(2) (a) If at any time after commitment of a 
person to the hospital under Section 
77-16a-4 whose sentence has not expired, if 
the superintendent of the hospital, or his 
designee, is of the opinion that the person: (i) 
is no longer mentally ill, or (ii) is still men-
tally ill and continues to be a danger to him-
self or others, but can be controlled if proper 
care, medication, and treatment are pro-
vided, and, in either case, (iii) has reached 
maximum benefit from the programs at the 
hospital, the superintendent or his designee 
shall apply to the Psychiatric Security Re-
view Board for a transfer of custody to the 
Board of Pardons. 
(b) The application shall be accompanied 
by a report setting forth the facts supporting 
the opinion of the superintendent or his des-
ignee, which shall include the clinical facts, 
the diagnosis, the course of treatment re-
ceived at the hospital, the prognosis of the 
remission of the symptoms, the potential for 
recidivism and the danger to himself or 
others, and the recommendations for future 
treatment. If the recommendations included 
in the application involve treatment in the 
community under conditions of parole or con-
ditional release, the application must also be 
accompanied by a verified plan of treatment. 
(3) (a) When the Psychiatric Security Review 
Board proposes to transfer custody of a de-
fendant from the Utah State Hospital to the 
Board of Pardons prior to the expiration of 
sentence, it shall transmit to the Board of 
Pardons a report on the condition of the de-
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fendant, including all pertinent information 
supplied by the superintendent or his desig-
nee. 
(b) The Psychiatric Security Review 
Board may make recommendations to the 
Board of Pardons as follows: 
(i) that the defendant serve any or all 
of his unexpired term of sentence at the 
state prison; 
(ii) that the defendant be placed on 
parole; or 
(iii) that the defendant be committed 
to the jurisdiction of the Psychiatric Se-
curity Review Board for conditional re-
lease in accordance with Chapter 38 of 
this title. 
(c) If the Psychiatric Security Review 
Board recommends to the Board of Pardons 
that a defendant be placed on parole or be 
placed under its jurisdiction for conditional 
release, it shall submit with that recommen-
dation a specific program for the care, cus-
tody, and treatment of the defendant. If the 
defendant is placed under the jurisdiction of 
the Psychiatric Security Review Board by 
the Board of Pardons for conditional release. 
failure to complete that program shall be 
grounds for revocation of conditional release 
in accordance with Chapter 38 of this title. 
(d) The Board of Pardons shall direct that 
the defendant serve any or all of the unex-
pired term of the sentence at the Utah State 
Prison, place the defendant on parole, or 
commit the defendant to the jurisdiction of 
the Psychiatric Security Review Board for 
conditional release in accordance with Chap-
ter 38. 
(e) Pending action of the Board of Par-
dons, the defendant shall remain under the 
jurisdiction of the Psychiatric Security Re-
view Board at the Utah State Hospital. 
(4) (a) If the defendant is placed on parole, 
treatment shall, upon the recommendation 
of the Psychiatric Security Review Board, be 
made a condition of parole. Failure to con-
tinue treatment or other condition of parole 
except by agreement with the designated 
mental health services provider and the 
Board of Pardons is a basis for initiation of 
parole violation hearings by the Board of 
Pardons. 
(b) The period of parole may not be for 
fewer than five years or until the expiration 
of the defendant's sentence, whichever oc-
curs first, and may not be reduced without 
consideration by the Board of Pardons of a 
current report on the mental health status of 
the offender. 1990 
77-16a-6. Probation for mentally ill persons. 
With regard to mentally ill but not mentally re-
tarded persons: 
(1) When the court proposes to place on proba-
tion a defendant who pleads or is found guilty 
and mentally ill, it shall request the Psychiatric 
Security Review Board to provide written recom-
mendations regarding whether the defendant 
should be placed on probation and. if the defen-
dant is to be placed on probation, a specific treat-
ment program for the defendant. If the defendant 
is placed on probation by the court, that treat-
ment program shall be made a condition of pro-
bation and the person shall remain under the 
jurisdiction of the sentencing court. Reports as 
specified by the trial judge shall be filed with the 
probation officer and the sentencing court. 
(2) Failure to continue treatment or other con-
dition of probation, except by agreement with the 
treating agency and the sentencing court, is a 
basis for the initiation of probation violation 
hearings. 
(3) The period of probation may not be fewer 
than five years or until the expiration of the de-
fendant's sentence, whichever comes first, and 
may not be reduced by the sentencing court with-
out consideration of a current report on the men-
tal health status of the offender. 
(4) Treatment or other care may be provided 
by or under contract with the Division of Mental 
Health, a local mental health authority, or, with 
the approval of the sentencing court, any other 
mental health provider. A report shall be filed 
with the probation officer and the sentencing 
court every three months during the period of 
probation. If a motion on a petition to discontinue 
probation is made by the defendant, the proba-
tion officer shall request a report. A motion on a 
petition to discontinue probation may not be 
heard more than once every six months. iwo 
77-16a-7. Jurisdiction of persons on probation. 
With regard to persons who have been found guilty 
and mentally ill and who have been placed on proba-
tion under the jurisdiction of the Psychiatric Security 
Review Board prior to the effective date of this act, 
the chairman of the Psychiatric Security Review 
Board shall petition the court within 60 days after 
that date for review of those orders. The court shall 
review and modify those orders to include placement 
under the jurisdiction of the sentencing court. iwo 
77-16a-8. Commitment of mentally retarded of-
fenders. 
With regard to defendants who are mentally re-
tarded, the following apply: 
(1) The court may order commitment, in accor-
dance with Section 77-16a-4, for a period not to 
exceed six months without benefit of a review 
hearing. Upon a review hearing, to be com-
menced prior to the expiration of a previous or-
der, an order for commitment may be made for an 
indeterminate period if the court finds by clear 
and convincing evidence that the required condi-
tions of Section 77-16a-4 will last for an indeter-
minate period. 
(2) A defendant committed, in accordance with 
Section 77-16a-4, for an indeterminate period is 
entitled to petition the sentencing court for a re-
hearing at six-month intervals, and the confine-
ment facility shall submit a report to the sen-
tencing court at 12-month intervals. 
(3) The period of commitment may in no cir-
cumstance be longer than the maximum sen-
tence imposed by the court. 
(4) When the facility to which a defendant has 
been committed under Section 77-16a-4 proposes 
to discharge the defendant prior to the expiration 
of his sentence, the facility shall transmit to the 
Board of Pardons a report on the condition of the 
defendant, including the clinical facts, the diag-
nosis, the course of treatment, the prognosis for 
the remission of symptoms, the potential for re-
cidivism and for the danger to himself or the pub-
lic, and recommendations for future treatment. 
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The Board of Pardons shall direct that the defen-
dant serve any or all of the unexpired term of the 
sentence at the state prison, or place the defen-
dant on parofe. If the Board of Pardons, pursuant 
to law or administrative rule, considers for parole 
any defendant who has been adjudged guilty and 
mentally ill, the board shall consult with the 
treating facility or agency and an additional re-
port on the condition of the defendant may be 
filed with the board. Pending action of the board, 
the defendant shall remain at the facility to 
which he was committed. If the defendant is 
placed on parole, treatment shall, upon the rec-
ommendation of that facility, be made a condi-
tion of parole, and failure to continue treatment 
or other condition of parole except by agreement 
with the designated facility and the Board of Par-
dons is a basis for initiating parole violation 
hearings. The period of parole may not be less 
than five years, or until the expiration of the de-
fendant's sentence, whichever comes first, and 
may not be reduced without consideration by the 
Board of Pardons of a current report on the men-
tal health status of the offender. 
(5) If a defendant who pleads or is found guilty 
and mentally ill is placed on probation under the 
jurisdiction of the sentencing court, the trial 
judge shall make treatment a condition of proba-
tion if the defendant is shown to be treatable and 
facilities exist for treatment of the offender in a 
probation status. Reports as specified by the trial 
judge shall be filed with the probation officer and 
the sentencing court. Failure to continue treat-
ment or other condition of probation, except by 
agreement with the treating agency and the sen-
tencing court, is a basis for the initiation of pro-
bation violation hearings. The period of proba-
tion may not be less than five years, or until the 
expiration of the defendant's sentence, whichever 
comes first, and may not be reduced by the sen-
tencing court without consideration of a current 
report on the mental health status of the of-
fender. Treatment or other care may be provided 
by an agency or division of the Department of 
Social Services, or with the approval of the sen-
tencing court, by any other handicapped services 
provider. A report shall be filed with the proba-
tion officer and the sentencing court every three 
months during the period of probation. If a mo-
tion on a petition to discontinue probation U 
made by the defendant, the probation officer 
shall request a report. A motion on a petition to 
discontinue probation may not be heard more 
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Section 
77-17-8. Mistake in charging offense — Proce-
dure. 
11-11-9. Separation or sequestration of jurors — 
Oath of officer having custody. 
77-17-10. Court to determine law; the jury, the 
facts. 
77-17-11. Jury to retire for deliberation — Oath of 
officer having custody. 
77-17-12. Defendant on bail appearing for trial 
may be committed. 
77-17-1. Doubt as to degree — Conviction only 
on l o w e s t 
When it appears the defendant has committed a 
public offense and there is reasonable doubt as to 
which of two or more degrees he is guilty, he shall be 
convicted only of the lower degree. isso 
77-17-2. Discharging one of several defendants 
— To testify for state. 
When two or more persons are included in the same 
charge, the court may at any time, on the application 
of the prosecuting attorney, direct any defendant to 
be discharged or his case severed so that he may be a 
witness for the prosecution. i960 
77-17-3. Discharge for insufficient evidence. 
When it appears to the court that there is not suffi-
cient evidence to put a defendant to his defense, it 
shall forthwith order him discharged. i960 
77-17-4. Conspiracy — Pleading — Evidence — 
Proof necessary. 
On a trial for conspiracy in a case where an overt 
act is necessary to constitute the offense, the defen-
dant shall not be convicted unless one or more overt 
acts are expressly alleged in the information or in-
dictment, and unless one of the acts alleged has been 
proved. However, proof of overt acts not alleged may 
be given in evidence. isao 
77-17-5. Proof of corporate existence or powers 
generally. 
In a criminal case the existence, constitution or 
powers of any corporation may be proved by general 
reputation, or by the printed statutes of the state, 
government or country by which this corporation was 
created. i960 
77-17-6. Lottery tickets — Evidence. 
(1) On a trial for violation of any of the lottery 
provisions of the Utah Criminal Code, it is not neces-
sary to prove: 
(a) The existence of any lottery in which any 
lottery tickets shall purport to have been issued; 
(b) The actual signing of any ticket or share, 
or pretended share of any pretended lottery; or 
(c) That any lottery ticket, share or interest 
was signed or issued by the authority of any 
manager, or of any person assuming to have au-
thority as manager. 
(2) In all cases, proof of the sale, furnishing, bar-
tering or procuring of any lottery ticket, share or in-
terest therein, or of any instrument purporting to be 
a ticket, or part or share of any ticket shall be evi-
dence that the share or interest was signed and is-
sued according to its purport. \%m 
77-17-7. Conviction on testimony of accomplice 
— Instruction to jury. 
( D A conviction may be had on the uncorroborated 
testimony of an accomplice. 
ADDENDUM B 
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PART 1 
PLEA AND VERDICT OF GUILTY AND MENTALLY 
ILL 
77-16a-101. Definitions. 
As used in this chapter: 
(1) "Board" means the Board of Pardons established under Section 
77-27-2. 
(2) "Department" means the Department of Human Services. 
(3) "Executive director" means the executive director of the Depart-
ment of Human Services. 
(4) "Mental health facility" means the Utah State Hospital or other 
facility that provides mental health services under contract with the divi-
sion, a local mental health authority, or organization that contracts with 
a local mental health authority. 
(5) "Mentally ill" means the same as that term is defined in Section 
76-2-305. 
(6) "Mentally ill offender" means an individual who has been adjudi-
cated guilty and mentally ill, including an individual who is mentally 
retarded. 
(7) "Mentally retarded" means the same as the term "mental retarda-
tion", defined in Section 62A-5-101. 
(8) "UDC" means the Department of Corrections. 
History: C. 1953, 77-16a-101t enacted by illness or insanity. For notes from cases on that 
L. 1992, ch. 171, $ 1. subject, see the Court Rules volume. 
Compiler's Notes. — Rule 21.5, Effective Dates. — Laws 1992, ch. 171, 
U.R.Crim.P., deals with pleas claiming mental § 18 makes the act effective on July 1, 1992. 
77-16a-102. Jury instructions. 
If a defendant asserts a defense of not guilty by reason of insanity, the court 
shall instruct the jury that it may find the defendant: 
(1) guilty; 
(2) not guilty; 
(3) not guilty by reason of insanity; 
(4) guilty and mentally ill; 
(5) guilty of a lesser offense; 
(6) guilty of a lesser offense and mentally ill; or 
(7) guilty of a lesser offense due to mental illness, but not a mental 
illness that warrants full exoneration. / 
History: C. 1953, 77-16a-102, enacted by Effective Dates. — Laws 1992, ch. 171, 
L. 1992, ch. 171, $ 2. § 18 makes the act effective on July 1, 1992. 
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77-16a-103. Plea of guilty and mentally ill. 
(1) Upon a plea of guilty and mentally ill being tendered by a defendant to 
any charge, the court shall hold a hearing within a reasonable time to deter-
mine whether the defendant is mentally ill. 
(2) The court may order the department to examine the defendant, and may 
receive the testimony of any public or private expert witness offered by the 
defendant or the prosecutor. The defendant may be placed in the Utah State 
Hospital for that examination only upon approval by the executive director. 
(3) (a) A defendant who tenders a plea of guilty and mentally ill shall be 
examined first by the trial judge, in compliance with the standards for 
taking pleas of guilty. The defendant shall be advised that a plea of guilty 
and mentally ill is a plea of guilty and not a contingent plea. 
(b) If the defendant is later found not to be mentally ill, that plea 
remains a valid plea of guilty, and the defendant shall be sentenced as 
any other offender. 
(4) If the court concludes that the defendant is currently mentally ill his 
plea shall be accepted and he shall be sentenced in accordance with Section 
77-16a-104. 
(5) (a) When the offense is a state offense, expenses of examination, obser-
vation, and treatment for the defendant shall be paid by the department. 
(b) Travel expenses shall be paid by the county where prosecution is 
commenced. 
(c) Expenses of examination for defendants charged with violation of a 
municipal or county ordinance shall be paid by the municipality or county 
that commenced the prosecution. 
History: C. 1953, 77-16a-103, enacted by Effective Dates. — Laws 1992, ch. 171. 
L. 1992, ch. 171, § 3. § 18 makes the act effective on July 1, 1992 
77-16a-104. Verdict of guilty and mentally ill — Hearing to 
determine present mental state. 
(1) Upon a verdict of guilty and mentally ill for the offense charged, or any 
lesser offense, the court shall conduct a hearing to determine the defendant's 
present mental state. 
(2) The court may order the department to examine the defendant to deter-
mine his mental condition, and may receive the evidence of any public or 
private expert witness offered by the defendant or the prosecutor. The defen-
dant may be placed in the Utah State Hospital for that examination only upon 
approval of the executive director. 
(3) If the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant is 
currently mentally ill, it shall impose any sentence that could be imposed 
under law upon a defendant who is not mentally ill and who is convicted of the 
same offense, and: 
(a) commit him to the department, in accordance with the provisions of 
Section 77-16a-202, if it finds by clear and convincing evidence that: 
(i) because of his mental illness the defendant poses an immediate 
physical danger to self or others, including jeopardizing his own or 
others' safety, health, or welfare if placed in a correctional or proba-
tion setting, or lacks the ability to provide the basic necessities of life, 
such as food, clothing, and shelter, if placed on probation; and 
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(ii> the department is able to provide the defendant with treat-
ment, care, custody, and security that is adequate and appropriate to 
the defendant's conditions and needs. In order to insure that the 
requirements of this subsection are met, the court shall notify the 
executive director of the proposed placement and provide the depart-
ment with an opportunity to evaluate the defendant and make a 
recommendation to the court regarding placement prior to commit-
ment; 
(b) order probation in accordance with Section 77-16a-201; or 
(c) if the requirements of Subsections (a) and (b) are not met, place the 
defendant in the custody of UDC. 
(4) If the court finds that the defendant is not currently mentally ill, it shall 
sentence the defendant as it would any other defendant. 
(5) Expenses for examinations ordered under this section shall be paid in 
accordance with Subsection 76-16a-103(5). 
History: C. 1953, 77-16a-104, enacted by Effective Dates. — Laws 1992, ch. 171, 
L. 1992, ch. 171, § 4. § 18 makes the act effective on July 1, 1992. 
PART 2 
DISPOSITION OF DEFENDANTS FOUND GUILTY 
AND MENTALLY ILL 
77-16a-201. Guilty and mentally ill — Probation. 
(1) (a) When the court proposes to place on probation a defendant who has 
pled or is found guilty and mentally ill, it shall request UDC to provide a 
presentence investigation report regarding whether probation is appro-
priate for that defendant and, if so, recommending a specific treatment 
program. If the defendant is placed on probation, that treatment program 
shall be made a condition of probation, and the defendant shall remain 
under the jurisdiction of the sentencing court. 
(b) The court may not place a mentally ill offender who has been con-
victed of a capital offense on probation. 
(2) The period of probation may be for no less than five years, or until the 
expiration of the defendant's sentence, whichever occurs first. Probation may 
not be subsequently reduced by the sentencing court without consideration of 
an updated report on the mental health status of the defendant. 
(3) (a) Treatment ordered by the court under this section may be provided 
by or under contract with the department, a mental health facility, a local 
mental health authority, or, with the approval of the sentencing court, 
any other public or private mental health provider. 
(b) The entity providing treatment under this section shall file a report 
with the defendant's probation officer at least every six months during 
the term of probation. 
(c) Any request for termination of probation regarding a defendant who 
is receiving treatment under this section shall include a current mental 
health report prepared by the treatment provider. 
(4) Failure to continue treatment or any other condition of probation, ex-
cept by agreement with the entity providing treatment and the sentencing 
court, is a basis for initiating probation violation hearings. 
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(5) The court may not release a mentally ill offender into the community, as 
a part of probation, if it finds by clear and convincing evidence that he: 
(a) poses an immediate physical danger to himself or others, including 
jeopardizing his own or others' safety, health, or welfare if released into 
the community; or 
(b) lacks the ability to provide the basic necessities of life, such as food, 
clothing, and shelter, if released into the community. 
(6) A mentally ill offender who is not eligible for release into the commu-
nity under the provisions of Subsection (5) may be placed by the court, on 
probation, in an appropriate mental health facility. 
History: C. 1953, 77-16a-201, enacted by Effective Dates. — Laws 1992. ch. 171, 
L. 1992, ch. 171, § 5. § 18 makes the act effective on July lt 1992. 
77-16a-202. Guilty and mentally ill — Commitment to de-
partment. 
(1) In sentencing and committing a mentally ill offender to the department 
under Subsection 77-16a-104(3)(a), the court shall: 
(a) sentence the offender to a term of imprisonment and order that he 
be committed to the department for care and treatment until transferred 
to UDC in accordance with Sections 77-16a-203 and 77-16a-204; or 
(b) sentence the offender to a term of imprisonment and order that he 
be committed to the department for care and treatment for no more than 
18 months, or until he has reached maximum benefit, whichever occurs 
first. At the expiration of that time, the court may recall the sentence and 
commitment, and resentence the offender. A commitment and retention 
of jurisdiction under this subsection shall be specified in the sentencing 
order. If that specification is not included in the sentencing order, the 
offender shall be committed in accordance with Subsection (a). 
(2) The court may not retain jurisdiction, under Subsection (1Mb), over the 
sentence of a mentally ill offender who has been convicted of a capital offense. 
In capital cases, the court shall make the findings required by this section 
after the capital sentencing proceeding mandated by Section 76-3-207. 
(3) When an offender is committed to the department under Subsection 
(1Kb), the department shall provide the court with reports of the ofTender's 
mental health status every six months. Those reports shall be prepared in 
accordance with the requirements of Section 77-16a-203. Additionally, the 
court may appoint an independent examiner to assess the mental health sta-
tus of the offender. 
(4) The period of commitment may not exceed the maximum sentence im-
posed by the court. Upon expiration of that sentence, the administrator of the 
facility where the offender is located may initiate civil proceedings for invol-
untary commitment in accordance with Title 62A, Chapter 12 or Title 62A, 
Chapter 5. 
History: C. 1953, 77.16a-202, enacted by Effective Dates. — Laws 1992. ch. 171, 
L. 1992, ch. 171, $6 . § 18 makes the act effective on July 1, 1992. 
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77-16a-203. Review of guilty and mentally ill persons com-
mitted to department — Recommendations for 
transfer. 
(1) The executive director shall designate a review team of at least three 
qualified staff members, including at least on£ licensed psychiatrist, to evalu-
ate the mental condition of each mentally ill offender committed to it in 
accordance with Section 77-16a-202, at least once every six months. If the 
offender is mentally retarded, the review team shall include at least one 
individual who is a designated mental retardation professional, as defined in 
Section 62A-5-301. 
(2) At the conclusion of its evaluation, the review team described in Subsec-
tion (1) shall make a report to the executive director regarding the offender's 
current mental condition, his progress since commitment, prognosis, and a 
recommendation regarding whether the mentally ill offender should be trans-
ferred to UDC or remain in the custody of the department. 
(3) (a) The executive director shall notify the UDC medical administrator, 
and the board's mental health adviser that a mentally ill offender is 
eligible for transfer to UDC if the review team finds that the offender: 
d) is no longer mentally ill; or 
(n) is still mentally ill and continues to be a danger to himself or 
others, but can be controlled if adequate care, medication, and treat-
ment are provided, and that he has reached maximum benefit from 
the programs within the department, 
(b) The administrator of the mental health facility where the offender 
is located shall provide the UDC medical administrator with a copy of the 
reviewing staffs recommendation and: 
d) all available clinical facts; 
(n) the diagnosis; 
dii) the course of treatment received at the mental health facility; 
dv) the prognosis for remission of symptoms; 
(v) the potential for recidivism; 
(vi) an estimation of the offender's dangerousness, either to him-
self or others; and 
(vn) recommendations for future treatment. 
History: C. 1953, 77-16a-203, enacted by Effective Dates. — Laws 1992, ch 171, 
L. 1992, ch. 171, $ 7. § 18 makes the act effective on July 1, 1992 
77-16a-204. Guilty and mentally ill — UDC acceptance of 
transfer. 
(1) The UDC medical administrator shall designate a transfer team of at 
least three qualified staff members, including at least one licensed psychia-
trist, to evaluate the recommendation made by the department's review team 
pursuant to Section 77-16a-203. If the offender is mentally retarded, the 
transfer team shall include at least one person who has expertise in testing 
and diagnosis of mentally retarded individuals. 
(2) The transfer team shall concur in the recommendation if it determines 
that UDC can provide the mentally ill offender with the level of care neces-
sary to maintain his mental condition. 
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(3) The UDC transfer team and medical administrator shall recommend 
the facility in which the offender should be placed and the treatment to be 
provided in order for his mental condition to remain stabilized to the director 
of the Division of Institutional Operations, within the Department of Correc-
tions. 
(4> In the event that the department and UDC do not agree on the transfer 
of a mentally ill offender, the administrator of the mental health facility 
where the offender is located shall notify the mental health adviser for the 
board, in writing, of the dispute. The mental health adviser shall be provided 
with copies of all reports and recommendations. The board's mental health 
adviser shall make a recommendation to the board on the transfer and the 
board shall issue its decision within 30 days. 
(5) UDC shall notify the board whenever a mentally ill offender is trans-
ferred from the department to UDC. 
History: C. 1953, 77-16a-204, enacted by Effective Dates. — Laws 1992, ch. 171, 
L. 1992, ch. 171, § 8. § 18 makes the act effective on July 1, 1992. 
77-16a-205. Guilty and mentally ill — Parole. 
(1) When a mentally ill offender who has been committed to the depart-
ment becomes eligible to be considered for parole, the board shall request a 
recommendation from the executive director and from UDC before placing the 
offender on parole. 
(2) Before setting a parole date, the board shall request that its mental 
health adviser prepare a report regarding the mentally ill offender, including: 
(a) all available clinical facts; 
(b) the diagnosis; 
(c) the course of treatment received at the mental health facility; 
(d) the prognosis for remission of symptoms; 
(e) potential for recidivism; 
(f) an estimation of the mentally ill offender's dangerousness either to 
himself or others; and 
(g) recommendations for future treatment. 
(3) Based on the report described in Subsection (2), the board may place the 
mentally ill offender on parole. The board may require mental health treat-
ment as a condition of parole. If treatment is ordered, failure to continue 
treatment, except by agreement with the treatment provider, and the board, 
is a basis for initiation of parole violation hearings by the board. 
(4) UDC, through Adult Probation and Parole, shall monitor the status of a 
mentally ill offender who has been placed on parole. UDC may provide treat-
ment by contracting with the department, a local mental health authority, 
any other public or private provider, or in-house staff. 
(5) The period of parole may be no less than five years, or until expiration of 
the defendant's sentence, whichever occurs first. The board may not subse-
quently reduce the period of parole without considering an updated report on 
the offender's current mental condition. 
History: C. 1953, 77-16a-205, enacted by Effective Dates. — Laws 1992. ch 171, 
L. 1992, ch. 171, § 9. * 18 makes the act effective on July 1. 1992. 
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